
Sotho war dances as illustrated by C.D. Bell in Andrew Smith’s journal 1834– 1836. Sotho military tactics and innovations were primarily for defence, using the Sotho knobkerrie, long spear, battle-axe and cowhide shield. The Sotho did not use the short stabbing spear invented by Shaka. From the 1820s to the early 1830s, their formidable army repeatedly and successfully defended the fl edgling Sotho ‘nation’ against external invaders, notably the Tlokwa of Chief Sekonyela, the Ngwane of Matiwane and the Ndebele of Mzilikazi. Sotho territorial chiefs commanded their own military formations and King Moshoeshoe had his own royal regi ment, commanded by Makoanyane, but the Sotho did not have professional fulltime regiments.
The Sotho ‘nation’ managed to survive in one form or another from the 1820s to the present, a remarkable achievement given the difficult conditions that prevailed in the region throughout the nineteenth century. Unlike Sekonyela or Moletsane, Moshoeshoe neither participated directly in a Difaqane raiding community nor left his home base between the Maluti mountains and the Caledon River. He was attacked intermittently by practically all of the main Difaqane marauders, but still was able to build his paramountcy over the Sotho.
When the wars began, Moshoshoe used a combination of force and diplomacy to build his power and following. In order to avoid confrontation, he sent tribute to Matiwane of the Ngwane, to the Tlokwa, and later to Shaka of the Zulu. This was the strategy of diplomacy for which Moshoeshoe later became famous. In 1822, apparently anticipating Tlokwa invasion, he had moved his people to Butha-Buthe, a flat-topped mountain, for better defence. When they were attacked, the Sotho rolled boulders down the steep slopes of the mountain and onto the invaders. Simultaneously, Moshoeshoe bargained with the invaders not to seize or destroy his accumulated seed grain. Finally, he managed to convince an Nguni marauder, Sepeka, to come to his aid by attacking Sekonyela.
During the fighting, Moshoeshoe escaped to the safety of another flat-topped mountain, Thaba Bosiu. While Moshoeshoe continued to be a rival to Sekonyela, he established alliances with other chiefs to the north, such as Sekwati of the Pedi. To the south, the dominant chief was Mokuoane of the Phuting. In order to pre-empt any plans by Mokuoane to attack Moshoeshoe, Moshoeshoe sent his brother Mohale to negotiate. The two sides struck a deal and remained faithful but independent allies who would sometimes conduct joint cattle raids in the south.
On Thaba Bosiu, Moshoeshoe subjugated its local ruler while maintaining his alliance with Matiwane. This continued until Matiwane’s followers, jealous of Moshoeshoe’s influence and believing that he was conspiring with Shaka, incited their chief to attack Moshoeshoe in his mountain stronghold. Matiwane was defeated and crossed the Drakensberg in an epic march to the Eastern Cape. Moshoeshoe was now the undisputed ruler of vast lands stretching from the Caledon River and westwards to Thaba Nchu. Thus his emerging kingdom included many hitherto independent chiefdoms, such as the Ramokhele chiefdom of Moseme.
Remnants of broken communities also joined Moshoeshoe for the security and

Evening prayer at Morija. The most important outside contact Moshoeshoe made was with the French missionaries. He invited the Paris Evangelical Mission Society (PEMS) to his kingdom, where they were settled from 1833, with Morija as their headquarters.
economic stability he could offer. He retained his herds and increased them through frequent raids. Moshoeshoe also increased his popularity and influence through the mafisa system in which he loaned cattle to impoverished newcomers. Despite this dependence upon him, Moshoeshoe allowed the satellite chiefs – usually settled on the periphery of the kingdom – to live in their own villages as they wished, following their own traditions. At the same time Moshoshoe also expected them to contribute to the stability and protection of his emerging kingdom, particularly as buffers against external invaders. Moshoshoe was thus continually expanding the geographical extent of his kingdom as well as its population into a loose but distinct community. Identification with Moshoeshoe’s polity was built not around language or culture, but through recognition of allegiance to him.
Despite this relative security the Sotho still continued to face raids from the Kora. Furthermore, from the late 1820s new influences began to filter into the kingdom. Apart from the threats from external African enemies, Moshoeshoe began to hear from returning refugees about the superior technology of the whites.
But perhaps the most important outside contact Moshoshoe made was with the French missionaries Thomas Arbousset, Eugène Casalis and Constant Cosselin. They belonged to the Paris Evangelical Mission Society (PEMS). Invited by Moshoshoe to his kingdom, they settled at Morija from1833. Moshoshoe also settled two of his sons with the missionaries at Morija, partly in order to understand their work and motives in greater depth. But once he had gained their confidence, Moshoshoe brought Casalis to live permanently at Thaba Bosiu to be his adviser and diplomatic agent in his dealings with white people.
Thus, as will be shown later, this ‘missionary factor’ gave Moshoeshoe strength and confidence in his interaction with whites. Many of the early Christians were to form the core of an educated elite, which articulated nationalist sentiments in the following years. The PEMS mission stations were dotted along the southwestern border of the kingdom where they became a buffer against Kora and Boer raids.







