A bywoner dwelling photographed for the Carnegie Commission’s report of 1936.
Milner did at times express views in favour of having a civilisation rather than a race barrier in the societies of the new colonies. He was, however, acutely aware of the views and prejudices of the white inhabitants and believed that it was vital not to alienate them. Commissioner of Native Affairs Godfrey Lagden was extremely paternalistic and condescending towards black people. Firm handling, he maintained, was essential ‘otherwise they will become insolent, habitual idlers and a terror to the Dominion . . . they cannot be allowed to roam about without passes or the country will become untenable by a white race’.
The British authorities had indeed introduced a more strictly implemented pass system that compelled all black people to carry identification passes and to produce them on demand for the duration of their service contracts. A limited number of blacks and coloureds were issued on application with ‘letters of exemption’ and ‘certificates of registration’ on grounds of ‘civilisation’. They were exempted from producing pass books on demand, but now they had to show the letter or certificate instead. In reality it was a distinction without a difference.
Both Milner and Lagden believed it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution in the field of race relations. It was Lagden who was appointed by Milner to be chairman of the South African Native Affairs Commission (1903–1905), consisting largely of English speakers, to draft a common policy towards black people for all four colonies. Its recommendations included territorial segregation and the establishment of political separation by means of setting up separate constituencies for black people in each colony. In embryonic form the outline of South Africa’s racial policies of the twentieth century can be discerned in the recommendations of this commission.
Chinese miners were brought to South Africa as part of mining capital’s reach to the East in the unrelenting search for cheaper labour. Chinese workers were often employed in the most dangerous – and most productive – jobs. A high percentage were to lose their lives in the course of their work.
One of the most pressing matters confronting Milner was the scarcity of black mine labour. In 1903 there was a shortage of more than 129 000 unskilled workers in the gold mining industry due in part to disillusionment with British rule, but more importantly because of a reduction in wages from the pre-war 43 shillings per month to 30 shillings per month. The administration took the view that the importation of Chinese labourers was most likely to provide a solution because they had no social connections with any other groups in the country. The first Chinese labourers arrived in South Africa in June 1904. This was a striking example of unity of purpose and co-operation between the forces of capitalism and imperialism. Of the nearly 64 000 Chinese who came to South Africa, the vast majority (62 000) were from the poverty-stricken agricultural northern Chinese provinces whose people had been prevented from going to work in Manchuria by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905.
On the mines a high proportion of the Chinese were employed in the most productive and dangerous jobs such as hand-drilling in the stopes. Of the 3 192 Chinese who died on the Witwatersrand between 1904 and 1910, 986 died of causes directly attributable to their conditions of work. Chinese resistance to their working conditions and their accommodation in the mine compounds often took the form of desertion and crime. Economically the experiment of Chinese labour seemed to have been successful but it extracted a huge social cost.
In April 1905 Milner left South Africa and was succeeded as high commissioner by the Earl of Selborne. W.B. Worsfold, John Buchan and Leo Amery formed a first generation of commentators who depicted the work of Milner and his administration in glowing terms. A more balanced interpretation highlights the insensitivity to the views and interests of black, Afrikaner and (on occasion) English-speaking South Africans. As for Milner, even some of his devotees came to believe that he was cold and detached, obstinate and blinkered, resentful of criticism and inclined to ignore the faults of those who supported him.
Milner himself did not think that he had succeeded in achieving his aims. Historians Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido offered a quite different assessment: ‘Milner succeeded in southern Africa better than he . . . realised . . . He laid the foundations for a state which not only reflected the demands of the twentieth-century British imperialism but also fulfilled them.’ While such an evaluation of Milner’s role does justice to the structural conditions for long-term capitalist investment that Milner cemented, in the short term he could not gain the upper hand in his political battle with Afrikanerdom.
