The government’s lifting of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation and extra-parliamentary movements on 2 February 1990 triggered a surge of political activity. Mass meetings attended by multitudes, particularly to hear Nelson Mandela, freed on 11 February 1990, together with strikes, street protests, demonstrations and violence of all kinds ushered in a period of profound uncertainty and potentially dangerous instability. Yet the security forces believed they could deal with any immediate challenge. In November 1992, the ANC leadership pointed out that while the regime had been weakened, the ANC was unable to overthrow it. ‘The regime still commands vast state and other military resources’, it stated. The time to talk had begun.
In meetings with senior police and military officers in early 1990 President F.W. de Klerk stated that it was no longer expected of them to promote certain political aims or to suppress others. The task of the police and the military was now solely to fight crime and protect all South Africans. Rejecting the undue influence of military and intelligence advisers on the Botha government, De Klerk rarely consulted the commanders of the security forces. There would be no calling up of the reserves or military parades or targeted assassinations. There would also be no angry withdrawal from the negotiating table, unlike the ANC, which would suspend negotiations and embark on rolling mass action.
